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1 
Foreword 
A Consequential Justice 
Robert A. Stein
†
 
Antonin Scalia served as Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States for more than twenty-nine years 
from his appointment by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 to 
his death in 2016. At the time of his death, Justice Scalia was 
the senior Justice on the Court. Justice Scalia’s length of 
service on the Court ranks 15th longest among the 112 Justices 
in Supreme Court history.
1
 
It is not the length of Justice Scalia’s service on the Court, 
but rather the consequence of his opinions that most 
distinguishes him. During his years on the Court, Justice 
Scalia was able to lead the Court to the right in a number of 
areas of law. 
When Justice Scalia visited the University of Minnesota 
Law School for a lecture and conversation on October 20, 2015,
2
 
he described Justice William Brennan as “the most influential 
Justice of the twentieth century.”
3
 In fact, Justice Scalia and 
Justice Brennan together represent two of the most 
consequential Justices on the Court during the sixty years 
since Justice Brennan’s appointment in 1956—Justice Brennan 
moving the Court to the left, and Justice Scalia subsequently 
moving the Court to the right. 
 
† 
 
Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
I would like to thank Nicholas R. Bednar, 2016 graduate of the University of 
Minnesota Law School, for his superb assistance in the preparation of this 
article. Copyright © 2016 by Robert A. Stein. 
 1. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_ 
text.aspx (last visited July 6, 2016). 
 2. The 2015 Stein Lecture: U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.umn.edu/events/ 
2015-stein-lecture-us-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia (last visited July 6, 
2016). 
 3. Justice Antonin Scalia, The 2015 Stein Lecture at the University of 
Minnesota (Oct. 20, 2015) [hereinafter The 2015 Stein Lecture]. 
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The manner by which Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia 
led the Court, however, was quite different. Justice Brennan, 
perhaps more than any other Justice in Supreme Court history, 
was a master in drafting an opinion to secure at least five votes 
to decide a case. Justice Scalia, however, has emphasized that 
his originalist and textualist jurisprudence left him with 
“nothing to trade.”
4
 Rather, Justice Scalia shifted the Court to 
the right through sheer intellect and combative opinion-
writing, which emphasized his own constitutional ideology. By 
comparing Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan, it becomes clear 
that, like Justice Brennan, Justice Scalia was a consequential 
Justice. 
To those monitoring Justice Brennan’s appointment in 
1956, it would come as a shock that he would lead the Warren 
Court’s expansion of civil rights, liberties, and judicial power.
5
 
Amidst a presidential election, President Dwight Eisenhower 
hoped to use the appointment of Justice Brennan to appease 
Catholic voters and the Association of State Court Judges.
6
 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell suggested Justice Brennan 
for Justice Sherman Minton’s seat following a speech given by 
Justice Brennan, which Brownell believed “seemed markedly 
conservative.”
7
 To Brownell, the future-Justice Brennan 
appeared more concerned with judicial administration than 
constitutional issues—a conservative Justice, but a Democrat, 
who could balance the Warren Court’s penchant for 
constitutional activism.
8
 
Brownell was wrong. Chief Justice Warren, a man with a 
vision, and Justice Brennan, a negotiator and tactician, formed 
an immediate alliance. As he was instrumental to the Warren 
Court’s project of constitutional expansion, his colleagues on 
the Court referred to Justice Brennan as “Deputy Chief.” 
Justice Brennan mastered the art of writing a majority opinion 
that could secure five votes. 
 
 4. Id. (“The originalist has nothing to trade.”). 
 5. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, THE LAST LIBERAL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. 
AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 13 (1993) (“Who was this 
Brennan, who had managed to attract five other Justices to his opinion and 
accomplish in an easy 6 to 2 majority, something Black had failed to do in 
sixteen years? Who was this man, virtual unknown, appointed by the 
conservative President Eisenhower, who seemed to be stepping past even the 
most tepid predictions of his influence?”). 
 6. Id. at 89. 
 7. Id. at 85. 
 8. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Prior to Justice Brennan’s arrival, scholars questioned 
whether the Warren Court would continue its constitutional 
push for civil rights, started in Brown v. Board of Education.
9
 
Cooper v. Aaron afforded Justice Brennan the opportunity to 
revitalize the Court’s liberal agenda.
10
 During oral arguments, 
Justice Brennan drilled the state government on its failure to 
pursue desegregation as a violation of the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause. Justice Brennan’s Supremacy Clause 
comments formed the crux of the majority opinion, ghost-
written by Justice Brennan on behalf of Chief Justice Warren.
11
 
Justice Brennan’s early efforts to restore judicial supremacy to 
the Court paved the way for future holdings, as well as building 
trust among the Court’s more absolutist judges, such as Justice 
William O. Douglas.
12
 
Perhaps no opinion demonstrates Justice Brennan’s ability 
to negotiate and expand the Court’s power than Baker v. Carr.
13
 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Baker recast the political 
question doctrine and held that redistricting issues presented 
justiciable questions.
14
 The road to such a momentous holding, 
however, was turbulent and fraught with contention. After two 
days of oral arguments, the Justices found themselves 
confronted with a 4–4 split, with Justice Potter Stewart 
refusing to decide at the first conference.
15
 Chief Justice 
Warren pushed the decision to the next term and called for a 
second round of arguments. This time, Justice Stewart 
admitted that Justice Brennan’s arguments convinced him to 
join the majority.
16
 At the request of Justice Stewart, Justice 
Brennan limited his opinion to the federal court’s jurisdiction.
17
 
But Justice Brennan’s coalition began to shake. Justice Tom 
 
 9. See Harry H. Wellington & Alexander M. Bickel, Legislative Purpose 
and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1957) 
(“More strikingly, since handing down its judgment in the Segregation Cases, 
the Court has declined to write further on the general subject, disposing by per 
curiam orders of a number of other cases which can only in the loosest way be 
held to be governed by the decision of May, 1954.”) (citations omitted). 
 10. See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that states 
are bound by Supreme Court decisions under the Supremacy Clause). 
 11. See EISLER, supra note 5, at 152–53. 
 12. See id. at 157. 
 13. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See EISLER, supra note 5, at 171. 
 16. EISLER, supra note 5, at 172. 
 17. EISLER, supra note 5, at 173. 
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Clark switched from the dissent to the majority, Justice 
Douglas threatened to write his own opinion believing Justice 
Brennan was not going far enough (a view Justice Clark soon 
took himself), and Justice Stewart moved closer toward the 
dissent. The drama of the case led Justice Charles Evans 
Whittaker to recuse himself—and eventually retire from the 
Court. Justices Douglas and Clark called for a stronger opinion 
in light of Clark’s more recent opinion, but Justice Brennan 
had promised to support Justice Stewart. Justice Brennan 
scurried from chamber to chamber in an effort to maintain his 
majority.
18
 On March 26, 1962, Justice Brennan announced his 
opinion, joined by Justice Hugo Black and Chief Justice 
Warren. Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart all wrote 
separately. In the end, only Justice Felix Frankfurter and 
Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented. Justice Brennan 
turned a 5–4 into a 6–2 decision, with one Justice succumbing 
to the mental anguish Baker brought before the Court. 
Baker v. Carr demonstrates Justice Brennan’s uncanny 
ability to write an opinion that could draw five votes for a 
majority holding. Fuelled by his willingness to compromise, 
Justice Brennan would tell his clerks, “With five votes around 
here you can do anything.”
19
 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
Justice Brennan wrote eight majority opinion drafts before 
eventually securing the votes of six Justices.
20
 Unlike Justice 
Brennan, other liberal Justices, notably Justice Black and 
Justice Douglas, often refused to negotiate their position. 
Justice Brennan recognized that if the Court was to pursue a 
liberal agenda and secure strong majorities, he had to meet his 
more conservative colleagues in the middle. As a result of his 
ability to form coalitions, Justice Brennan authored some of the 
most influential constitutional law opinions of the twentieth 
century, expanding civil rights, First Amendment rights,
21
 and 
substantive due process.
22
 Justice Brennan became a 
consequential Justice not by virtue of strong, uncompromising 
ideology, but rather his results-oriented approach to coalition 
building. 
 
 18. EISLER, supra note 5, at 174–75. 
 19. EISLER, supra note 5, at 178. 
 20. EISLER, supra note 5, at 186. 
 21. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 22. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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When President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Scalia to 
the bench in 1986, commentators suspected he would play a 
similar coalition-building role for the conservatives as Justice 
Brennan had for the liberals.
23
 Coalition-building did not 
interest Justice Scalia. Rather, Justice Scalia compares more 
readily to the absolutist positions of Justices Douglas and 
Black. Justice Scalia felt bound by his views as a textualist and 
originalist, both of which provided him a formulaic way of 
answering legal questions. Yet Justice Scalia was an 
intellectual juggernaut. His colorful rhetoric, unapologetic 
dissents, and vigorous defense of his ideology reverberated 
throughout the conservative legal community. Justice Scalia 
fiercely criticized the judicial activist and “living constitution” 
philosophies of his colleagues, such as Justice Brennan.
24
 Even 
absent the same cooperative attitude of Justice Brennan, 
Justice Scalia managed to shift the Court right in a number of 
areas. 
At his confirmation hearing, Senator Strom Thurmond 
asked Justice Scalia why the U.S. Constitution had endured as 
“the oldest existing Constitution in the world today.”
25
 Justice 
Scalia responded: 
What makes it work, what assures that those words [in the Bill of 
Rights] are not just hollow promises, is the structure of government 
that the original Constitution established, the checks and balances 
among the three branches, in particular, so that no one of them is 
able to “run roughshod” over the liberties of the people as those 
liberties are described in the Bill of Rights.
26
 
Justice Scalia valued the strict structural guarantees of the 
U.S. Constitution, namely separation of powers and federalism. 
His adherence to these ideals shaped American law and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence over the course of three decades. 
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court held that the 
appointment of an independent counsel to prosecute high-
ranking executive branch officials did not violate the separation 
of powers.
27
 Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. He feared 
that Congress could “effectively compel[ ] a criminal 
 
 23. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3 (“Scalia, he’s such a likeable 
fellow, he’s going to put together a new conservative coalition. That was 
foolish.”). 
 24. See, e.g., RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT 
AND TRADITION 25, 207, 222 (2006). 
 25. Id. at 53. 
 26. Id. (alteration in original). 
 27. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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investigation of a high-level appointee of the President in 
connection with his actions arising out of a bitter power dispute 
between the President and the Legislative Branch.”
28
 In 
passing the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress 
revoked the President’s investigative and charging authority as 
the federal government’s sole executive under Article II, 
Section I of the Constitution, handing those powers instead to a 
“mini-Executive that is the independent counsel.”
29
 Thus, the 
statute “deprive[d] the President of exclusive control over that 
quintessentially executive activity.”
30
 Morrison resulted in the 
most complete statement of Justice Scalia’s beliefs on the 
separation of powers: 
Where a private citizen challenges action of the Government on 
grounds unrelated to separation of powers, harmonious functioning of 
the system demands that we ordinarily give some deference, or a 
presumption of validity, to the actions of the political branches in 
what is agreed, between themselves at least, to be within their 
respective spheres. But where the issue pertains to separation of 
powers, and the political branches are (as here) in disagreement, 
neither can be presumed correct. The reason is stated concisely by 
Madison: “The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the 
terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can 
pretend to an exclusive or superior right to settling the boundaries 
between their respective powers . . . .” Federalist No. 49, p. 314. The 
playing field for the present case, in other words, is a level one. As one 
of the interested and coordinate parties to the underlying 
constitutional dispute, Congress, no more than the President, is 
entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
31
 
Justice Scalia’s defense of the Constitution’s structural 
balance struck a chord with Congress and others aligned with 
his views. At his confirmation hearings, Justice Samuel Alito 
told the Senate that Morrison “hit the separation of powers 
doctrine ‘about as hard as heavyweight champ Mike Tyson 
usually hits his opponents.’”
32
 After a growing number of 
scandals, Congress grew weary of the often political and 
partisan nature of the independent counsel—even allowing the 
law to lapse for eighteen months in 1992.
33
 In 1999, Senator 
 
 28. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 732. 
 30. Id. at 706. 
 31. Id. at 704–05. 
 32. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, After Memo, Democrats Are 
Taking Firmer Stance Against Alito Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at 
A24. 
 33. Independent Probes of Clinton Administration Cost Nearly $80 
million, CNN (Apr. 1, 1999, 11:32 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/ 
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Christopher Dodd echoed Justice Scalia’s sentiments: “For 180 
years, we had a good system. It can work. It can work again. 
We don’t need this independent counsel statute.”
34
 On June 30, 
1999, the independent counsel law lapsed, reverting 
prosecutorial authority to the Justice Department.
35
 
Morrison and its aftermath exemplify Justice Scalia’s 
influence on the separation of powers within the branches of 
the federal government. Similarly, Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Printz v. United States demonstrates his efforts to 
curb federal encroachment on states’ rights.
36
 Printz concerned 
the constitutionality of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, which commanded local law enforcement 
officers to conduct background checks on individuals seeking to 
purchase handguns.
37
 Examining eighteenth century statutes, 
Justice Scalia argued that the “utter lack of statutes imposing 
obligations on the States’ executive (notwithstanding the 
attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed 
absence of such power.”
38
 The Constitution established a system 
of “dual sovereignty.”
39
 Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by 
stating: 
Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by 
conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of 
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, 
and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; 
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.
40
 
Printz demonstrates Justice Scalia’s veneration of 
federalist principles. During his time on the Court, Justice 
Scalia joined and authored other opinions stripping the federal 
 
stories/1999/04/01/counsel.probe.costs; David Johnston, Weinberger Faces 5 
Counts in Iran-Contra Indictment, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1992), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1992/06/17/us/weinberger-faces-5-counts-in-iran-contra-
indictment.html. 
 34. Senators Predict End to Independent Counsel Act, CNN (Mar. 1, 1999), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/01/independent.counsel/. 
 35. Roberto Suro, Power Shifts to Reno Without Special Counsel, WASH. 
POST (June 30, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/ 
counsels/stories/counsel063099.htm. 
 36. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 37. Id. at 902. 
 38. Id. at 907–08. 
 39. Id. at 918. 
 40. Id. at 935. 
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government, namely Congress, of the authority to infringe on 
states’ rights.
41
 Thus, Justice Scalia suppressed many of the 
Supreme Court holdings of the Warren Court that 
strengthened federal supremacy.
42
 
In the realm of individual rights, Justice Scalia believed 
that his ideology “handcuffed” him, preventing him from 
pursuing the “nasty, conservative things” many accused him of 
wanting to do.
43
 At times, his personal beliefs clashed with 
originalism. In Texas v. Johnson, in which the Supreme Court 
held that the First Amendment protected flag burning, Justice 
Scalia joined Justice Brennan’s majority opinion.
44
 Left to his 
personal beliefs, Justice Scalia has stated that he would throw 
all flag burners in jail.
45
 But his originalist reading of the First 
Amendment broadly protects freedom of speech and, therefore, 
Justice Scalia’s personal preferences succumbed to his 
ideological adherences. 
In other policy areas, Justice Scalia found an originalist 
basis for opinions he otherwise agreed with. No case 
demonstrates this more than District of Columbia v. Heller.
46
 
Heller questioned whether a District of Columbia law 
prohibiting the possession of handguns violated the Second 
Amendment.
47
 Pointing to the operative clause of the Second 
Amendment, Justice Scalia contended that “‘bear arms’ was 
 
 41. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Violence 
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (the 
Commerce Clause did not permit Congress to regulate the carrying of 
handguns). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress may 
regulate and ban medical marijuana). 
 42. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964) (holding that Congress could use the Commerce Clause to force 
businesses to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 43. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3. 
 44. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 45. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3. During his lecture, Justice 
Scalia also included a personal anecdote about Texas v. Johnson:  
I was the fifth vote in the flag vote in the flag burning case . . . . I 
don’t like people who go around burning the American flag. If it was 
up to me, I would put them all in jail. But, I am not a king. And as I 
interpret the First Amendment, they are entitled to burn the flag—
their own flag—to protest the country. So, I was the fifth vote. I come 
down for breakfast the next morning. My wife, who is a very 
conservative woman (she stops me from sliding to the left), she is 
scrambling eggs or something at the stove and humming “It’s a Grand 
Old Flag.” 
 46. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 574. 
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unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside 
of an organized militia.’”
48
 The prefatory clause—centered on “a 
well regulated Militia”—simply denoted the purpose of the 
Second Amendment: “to prevent elimination of the militia.”
49
 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the right secured by the 
Second Amendment is not unlimited.
50
 While “the Constitution 
leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating 
[gun violence],” an absolute prohibition on handguns is not one 
of them.
51
 
Gun advocates praised Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller.
52
 
Liberals claimed Justice Scalia’s love of hunting tainted his 
opinion. Judge Richard Posner criticized Justice Scalia’s 
opinion as “faux originalism” with a “historicizing glaze on 
personal values and policy preferences.”
53
 Regardless of Judge 
Posner’s attacks, Justice Scalia still founded his opinion in 
originalism through historical support for his arguments. 
Juxtaposed to cases like Texas v. Johnson, it is hard to contend 
Justice Scalia merely embraced originalism when it best 
advanced his own beliefs. In sum, Justice Scalia’s originalism 
informed the Court’s decisions concerned not only with the 
structure of U.S. government, but also the substance of U.S. 
law. 
Justice Scalia’s prominence comes not only from his 
majority opinions, but also with his ability to sway the other 
branches and the Court through robust and well-argued 
opinions. As an ideologue, Justice Scalia preferred his 
subjectively “correct” answer to the most mutually agreeable 
answer.
54
 Justice Scalia cites his adherence to originalism and 
textualism as the reason for his inability to form coalitions. 
Another, perhaps pettier, view suggests that Justice Scalia 
isolated himself by attacking his colleagues. Asked whether his 
strong language ever made it difficult to secure five votes, 
Justice Scalia responded, “You really think my colleagues are 
going to mess up American law because they are peeved at me? 
 
 48. Id. at 584. 
 49. Id. at 599. 
 50. Id. at 626. 
 51. Id. at 636. 
 52. Heller: The Supreme Decision, NRA-ILA (June 27, 2008), 
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20080627/heller. 
 53. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 26, 
2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness. 
 54. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3 (“I’d rather be right.”). 
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. . . It’s certainly not hampered by the fact that I criticize my 
[colleague’s opinions].”
55
 
One still wonders whether Justice Scalia’s sharp tongue 
earned him any grudges. In United States v. Windsor, Justice 
Scalia dismissed the majority’s opinion as “legalistic argle-
bargle.”
56
 In the spiritual successor to Windsor, Obergefell v. 
Hodges, he called the majority’s opinion “as pretentious as its 
content is egotistic,” contending that its “profundities are often 
profoundly incoherent.”
57
 Concurring in Glossip v. Gross, 
Justice Scalia attacked the dissent: “Even accepting Justice 
Breyer’s rewriting of the Eighth Amendment, his argument is 
full of internal contradictions and (it must be said) gobbledy-
gook.”
58
 His colorful and entertaining opinions captured the 
attention of the media and law students. Indeed, he admitted 
that he wrote his “interesting” and “memorable” dissents for 
law students in hopes for that “next generation” may adopt his 
ideologies.
59
 In contrast, majority opinions confined Justice 
Scalia to write “what [his] colleague would let [him] write.”
60
 
But if Justice Scalia developed a reputation for harsh language 
(which he most certainly did), it perhaps made his more 
malleable colleagues reluctant to join coalitions backed by 
Justice Scalia’s originalist or textualists opinions. Without 
internal confirmation, we may never know if Justice Scalia’s 
inability to form coalitions, like Justice Brennan was able to do, 
was in part due to his aggressive language. 
A comparison of Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia 
illustrates at least two ways a Justice can become 
“consequential.” Justice Brennan is consequential because he 
formed coalitions, mobilizing the court to pursue a liberal 
agenda—even if this agenda was more moderate than he would 
have wanted. Justice Brennan moved the court through 
negotiation and willingness to meet his conservative colleagues 
halfway. Justice Scalia is consequential for nearly opposite 
reasons. Justice Scalia pursued ideology over cooperation. His 
unrelenting stances and intellectual prowess made fellow 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 57. Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 58. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 59. The 2015 Stein Lecture, supra note 3. 
 60. Id. 
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judges, lawyers, and lawmakers think about the proper 
structure of our government. He moved the Court right by 
injecting originalist viewpoints into precedent. Justice Brennan 
and Justice Scalia’s goals differed. Whereas Justice Brennan 
sought to garner power for the Court to protect civil rights, 
Justice Scalia sought to preserve the balance of government. 
Both offer invaluable perspectives on the role of the judiciary, 
the structure of the federal government, and the substance of 
U.S. law. Had their terms overlapped more than four years, we 
would have witnessed a proverbial clash of titans on many of 
the questions raised by their methodologies and philosophies. 
Indeed, in those mere four years Justice Brennan and Justice 
Scalia often dueled in conflicting dissents and concurrences.
61
 
Absent a persistent battle royale, however, we must analyze 
the consequence of Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court and U.S. law as ships 
passing in the night. 
 
 
 61. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990) (clashing on First Amendment rights of corporations); Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (disagreeing on the extent of due process rights 
and the meaning of “liberty” and “freedom”); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss., 
487 U.S. 354 (1988) (disputing the extent of Chevron deference). 
